In the name of God
Answer to some questions on the issue of Peaceful nuclear technology of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Introduction
During the past few years, the USA and some western countries have waged an unfair one-sided propaganda through their strong mass media and have misused the issue of nuclear energy as an instrument to exert pressure on Iran.
These countries – under the pretext of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons – try to deprive Iran from using the vital knowledge of nuclear technology. Meanwhile, they have many contradictions in dealing with the issue of nuclear energy of Iran. First, these countries don’t abide by their own relevant commitments in the NPT. Second, they use double standards in dealing with developing countries. Third and the more stranger is that they implement different standards in dealing with the same country in different occasions. For example, in case of Iran, before the victory of Islamic Revolution, the western countries didn’t consider Iran’s nuclear energy program as a threat to international peace and security, rather they encouraged it. But after the victory of Islamic Revolution, the same western countries considered Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities as a threat to world peace and security. It’s obvious that Iran had embarked on its nuclear program several years before the Islamic Revolution. At that time the western countries didn’t oppose to Iran’s nuclear activities, rather helped Iran to develop its program. But after the victory of Islamic Revolution they did their best to prevent the development of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.
Background of Iran's nuclear program
The first step toward nuclear technology in Iran was taken by establishment of “Tehran University Atomic Center” in 1956. It was three years after the launch of Eisenhower Plan on “Atom for Peace” in 1953. In promoting this plan, the then president of USA delivered an atomic reactor to Iran with the capacity of 5 MW. That reactor was used to work with uranium enriched up to 93% provided by the USA. It should be mentioned that uranium enriched above 90% could be used to build atomic bomb. Furthermore, the US government delivered to Iran the hot cell facilities to separate uranium.
In 1974, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran [AEOI] was established. Subsequently, the then government made a very huge amount of investment for the rapid growth of nuclear science. The main goal of the government was to build 23 atomic reactors with the capacity of 23,000 MW. The number of manpower in AEOI was increased drastically and hundreds of experts were dispatched for training to the US, Germany, UK, France, Canada, Italy and Belgium. In 1974 Iran paid US$ 1 billion to France to build Tricastin enrichment uranium facilities and bought 10% of ORDIF share.
During 1974 – 1978 the contracts or agreements to build 8 atomic power plants were signed by AEOI and the foreign contractors including Bushehr atomic power plant [Iran I and II] by Germany, Karun atomic power plant [Iran III and IV] by France, Isfahan atomic power plant [Iran V and VI] by Germany and Saveh atomic power plant [Iran VII and VIII] by Germany. During 1974 – 1976 Iran signed extendable 10 years contracts for fuel cycle with USA, Germany and France respectively.
At that time the western countries used to compete with each other to provide fuel cycle to Iran. The strange point is that at that time there was no discussion on Iran’s nuclear energy as a country that had oil and gas resources, and, there was not any discussion why Iran, having large resources of oil and gas, seeks nuclear fuel. Bearing in mind that during the past 30 years the population of Iran has been doubled, considering ever increasing demand of energy and shortage of fossil energy resources and high expenses of its exploitation, it’s natural that Iran seeks other reliable energy resources.
Anyhow, a comparison between Iran's nuclear program before and after the revolution proves that a double standard with the political motivations has been imposed upon Iran by the western countries.
After the victory of Islamic Revolution we decided to follow our peaceful nuclear program. But it was encountered by severe objection by the US and some western countries. We moved forward in the framework of NPT regulations, relying on our own capabilities which resulted to considerable achievements. When the West accused us to seek military objectives, we decided to answer to western concerns and we cooperated with EU3 to prove that our nuclear program is peaceful. At early stages of negotiations they asked us to suspend enrichment activities in Natanz which was accepted by us. Then they asked us to suspend all of our nuclear activities including research. Again we agreed to show our good will. On December 2003 we suspended our enrichment activities. This suspension was not based on our commitments, but was voluntarily and temporarily. After a while we understood that they wanted the suspension to be changed to a binding commitment for our country. Then we signed additional protocol and started to implement it, even before its ratification in the parliament.
We had started the negotiations with the West with this presumption that they had genuine legitimate concerns about our peaceful nuclear activities. Also we believed that peaceful nuclear technology is our inalienable right. We negotiated with the EU3 for three years. But later we came to conclusion that we have wasted our time and energy for the three years. In March 2005 we submitted our proposal to EU but after five months they rejected the proposal. In August 2005 they gave us their proposal package and unfortunately they requested full and open-ended suspension of our enrichment activities. After three years of negotiations we concluded that in this manner we could not gain our rights. So we restarted our enrichment activities. On the 1st of June 2006 they proposed a new package and we answered that in spite of some ambiguities, we will review it positively and we would reply till 22 of August. But unfortunately they passed resolution No. 1696 in the UN Security Council. In spite of this resolution, on 22 of August we responded to EU3 proposal. On 23 December 2006 they passed resolution No. 1737 in the Security Council, imposing sanctions against Iran including restrictions on Iranian personals and firms. On 23 March 2007 they issued resolution No. 1747, to intensify ever more pressure on Iran.
It should be mentioned that Iran categorically rejects the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, on ideological and strategic grounds.
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Here we answer to some probable questions regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
1 - What are the legal bases for Iran nuclear activities?
There are four documents as the legal bases of our nuclear activities:
• IAEA statute
• NPT
• Safeguard Agreement
• Additional Protocol [93+2]
IAEA statute
The IAEA statute allows research on nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. According to IAEA the peaceful usage of nuclear technology not only has been recognized but also has been encouraged. The article 3 of the statute allows the Agency to encourage and assist the research on nuclear energy, its development and practical usage of nuclear energy for non-military purposes throughout the world.
NPT
Article 4 of NPT emphasizes on the right of member states to have access to peaceful nuclear technology. Article 5 of NPT rejects the monopoly of nuclear knowledge for certain countries. Iran is one of the members of the NPT and started to implement its regulations since 1974.
Safeguard Agreement
Iranian government has signed this document in 1973 which has been registered under the document No.INFICIRC/214 at the secretariat of The Agency. Article 4 of the agreement stipulates that implementation of this agreement should be in a manner that will not prevent economic and technical development or international cooperation of Iran on peaceful nuclear activities.
Additional Protocol
Iran has signed the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and started to implement it temporarily and voluntarily. The information published by the Agency shows that up to October 2006 only 110 countries have signed the additional protocol and only 78 countries started to implement it. Some of the NPT members have not yet signed the additional protocol.
According to the four documents, the right of development of peaceful nuclear technology has been neither prohibited nor limited, rather is supported and encouraged. But of course the documents insist on the verification of activities.
2- Why Iran doesn’t rely only on its oil and gas resources?
• The existing fossil energy resources will be finished sooner or later and they are not unlimited.
• The right of next generations to use the fossil energy resources.
• Destructive and non-repairable environmental consequences of the usage of fossil fuel.
• High cost of new energies like solar and geothermal.
• High value-added in processing crude oil and other fossil fuels. Thousands of products are derived from these resources.
• Industrial development and growing consumption in Iran has led to increasing need of energy.
• The increasing demand of electricity (according to 20 years comprehensive economic plan of Iran the production of electricity in the country should reach to 120.000 MW per year up to 2027).
• Nuclear energy is applicable in different industries, including medical, agriculture and other fields of sciences.
3. Why Iran does not accept dependency to nuclear fuel from abroad?
• Our experiences and of the other countries show that we should not rely on the others in a strategic and sensitive issue like nuclear energy. Even if we agree to import nuclear fuel from abroad, there’s no guaranty for the continuation of nuclear fuel supply in the future.
• There’s no binding document to guarantee the security of nuclear fuel supply, and no mechanism has yet been installed in this regard.
• The Western countries have not abided at least in case of Iran by their commitments, and for this reason we had no choice but to produce nuclear fuel by ourselves.
• We have proposed the establishment of a consortium to produce nuclear fuel in Iran in cooperation with other countries including the USA. But the western countries have so far refused to accept this proposal.
• Recently, a bill on the establishment of international bank for nuclear fuel has been adopted by the US congress. The aim of the bill is to control the monopoly of energy of the world and its usage as an instrument to prevent the economic development of other countries. The proposal, while weakening the NPT, gives no guaranty to developing countries to use the bank.
• Undoubtedly, the western countries have the intention to expand their monopoly to the other sensitive fields of science like bio-technology, embryonic cells and etc.
4. Why Iran insists on uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel production even after receiving nuclear fuel from Russia?
• Iran has received consignments of nuclear fuel from Russia. But this fuel is going to be allocated only for part of the need of Bushehr reactor. Iran needs nuclear fuel for other nuclear reactors on the pipe.
• According to Iranian national energy policy, the nuclear energy would supply 20% of total demand equal to 20000 MW of electricity during 20 years.
• We need secured and guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for long time.
• Domestic production of nuclear fuel is more economic and justifiable.
5. What Iran has done to build confidence on its nuclear program?
• Iran has signed and implemented Additional Protocol. Iran signed and fully and voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol for over two years. This voluntary implementation took place despite the fact that Iran Parliament had yet to ratify the Protocol. However, the referral of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program to the Security Council made it impossible for the government to continue the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, due to a decision by the Parliament.
• Iran has placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA Safeguards. • Iran has allowed over 2700 person days of IAEA scrutiny of all its related and even unrelated facilities, resulting in repeated statements by the Agency on the absence of any evidence of diversion. • Iran has provided precise and regular reports of its nuclear activities,
• Iran has voluntarily suspended its lawful enrichment activities for over two years, verified by the IAEA. • Iran has proposed to cooperate with foreign companies in its enrichment projects,
• Iran has proposed to create a nuclear consortium in cooperation with all countries including the USA.
• Iran has voluntarily put its nuclear facilities under the IAEA inspection. (Iran is the only country that has requested for such an inspection). The IAEA inspections are in three types “Routine”, “Special”, and “Voluntarily”. Voluntary inspections have not been mentioned in the (INFCIRC/153), IAEA statute and regulations of NPT and for the first time was asked by Iran. Therefore Iran is the only country that voluntarily invited IAEA inspectors to scrutinize its nuclear facilities. The November 15, 2007 report of the Agency stresses that “Since March 2007, a total of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP”. • Iran has cooperated with the IAEA inspectors beyond the NPT regulations, even intrusive type inspections of its military sites have been done which would not be easily allowed anywhere else in the world .
6. Why Iran’s activities have not been verified yet?
• “Verification” is a long term process and it would not be possible to be done in short time. As Director General of the IAEA has stated, the Agency’s assessment on verification of non-declared activities is a long and time-consuming process.
• There are lots of countries which their nuclear activities have yet to be verified.
• Based on the report of the implementation of the NPT in 2006, there is no any sign of diversion of declared nuclear materials from peaceful activities in 43 countries including Iran.
7. What are the reasons for alleged clandestine nuclear program of Iran?
Iran has informed its nuclear activities to the IAEA as follows:
• In 2000 Iran submitted design inquiry questionnaire (DIC) to the IAEA. Iran was not obliged to do so before 2000 because according to the Safeguard Agreement, Iran was obliged to submit the information only 180 days before the arrival of materials to the factory.
• Iran accepted and modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangement in 2003. Iran had no obligation to accept its commitments before 2003.
• According to the Safeguard Agreement, up to 10 tons of yellow cake is exempted from inspection. Iran used only 57 kg of yellow cake in laboratory research.
• According to the Safeguard Agreement, up to 1 kg of plutonium is exempted from inspection. Iran has used only 200 mg of plutonium in laboratory research.
8. Why Iran disagrees with the suspension of Uranium enrichment?
• Suspension was in place by Iran for more than two years and the IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran fully suspended what it had agreed to suspend in each and every report from November 2003 to February 2006. During this period, it became abundantly clear that those seeking to prolong suspension were indeed aiming to perpetuate it, and therefore, depriving the Iranian nation from exercising its inalienable rights.
• The attempt to make the suspension mandatory has been, from the outset, against the fundamental principles of international law, the Non- Proliferation Treaty and IAEA resolutions. • Neither in IAEA statute nor in NPT-safeguards, nor even in the Additional Protocol, “enrichment” and “reprocessing” are prohibited or restricted. Even, there is no limit for the level of enrichment in the said documents.
• Considering the substantial progress made by Iran in resolving the outstanding questions, and the IAEA’s constant conclusion on non-diversion of Iran’s nuclear activities, there remains no reason for those few countries to insist on their unjust position on the illegal request for suspension.
• The past experiences well indicate that the insistence of a few countries on suspension lacks good faith and credibility, since their main goal is to perpetuate the suspension with the ultimate objective of obliterating Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.
9. What is the last situation of negotiations between I. R. of Iran and the IAEA?
The Islamic Republic of Iran, despite some actions by a few countries to interrupt the negotiations, has taken a new initiative. Iran agreed to take a major step in negotiating with the Agency on the modality of resolving and concluding a few outstanding issues. Pursuant to the agreement, three rounds of negotiations between Iranian officials and the Agency were held on July and August 2007. As a result of negotiations, the final text of mutual understanding (INFCIRC/711 27 August 2007) was concluded on 21 August 2007 in Tehran. The conclusion of the mutual understanding was made during 40 days, - 20 days earlier than expected - and this demonstrates Iran’s seriousness in its initiative. It should be mentioned that at the beginning of the negotiations, some western countries questioned Iran’s determination to fulfill the above-mentioned work plan, and even after the conclusion of agreement, they tried to undermine it. (The statement of the IAEA officials has complained that “the US is mounting a deliberate campaign to derail Iranian-IAEA rapprochement”. ) Furthermore, some countries proposed new draft resolutions in the UN Security Council against Iran and even threatened Iran to military attack. These countries try to divert Iran’s nuclear issue from negotiation and cooperation to intimidation and confrontation.
10. How is the implementation of work plan between Iran and IAEA?
Based on agreement achieved by Iran and IAEA in 21st August 2007, issues discussed between Iran and IAEA were divided to two parts, current issues and previous issues.
Iran’s measures related to the current issues are as follow: the starting of technical talks with IAEA with the aim of compiling document (The Safeguard Approach and Facility Attachment) for Natanz enrichment facility, acceptance of appointed inspectors, supervision on heavy water reactor of Arak, and the issuance of multiple visas to some IAEA inspectors and staffs.
On the past issues, IAEA has given the list of 6 outstanding issues between Iran and IAEA. The list is as follow: the issue of plutonium, centrifuges P1 and P2, source of contamination, metal uranium document, polonium-210, and mine of Gachin.
• Plutonium issue: IAEA formally declared that the issue has been resolved. It should be mentioned that this issue was the reason for the US to raise Iran’s nuclear program as the threat to world peace and security .
• The issue of centrifuges P1 and P2: This issue also was resolved, and Mr. Al-Baradei, Director General of IAEA formally declared that Iran’s answers related to centrifuges P-1 and P-2 are compatible with IAEA findings. The IAEA report indicates that “the Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs are consistent with its findings”. That was the focus of the western accusations against Iran’s nuclear activities
• The Issue of metal uranium document: On 8th November 2007, in the demand of IAEA, Iran provided the copies of relevant documents. According to the agreement between Iran and IAEA, this issue also is resolved.
• The source of contamination: The new report of IAEA says that the Agency concluded that the explanation and supporting documentation provided by Iran regarding the possible source of contamination by uranium particles at the university were not inconsistent with the data currently available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage.
• The issue of Polonium-210: Based on an examination of all information provided by Iran, the Agency concluded that the explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the polonium-210 experiments were consistent with the Agency’s findings and with other information available to it. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage.
• The issue of Gachin mine: The Agency concluded that the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage.
The latest two reports of the Agency clearly indicate that all outstanding issues are resolved. The report of the IAEA Director General on 15 November 2007, yet again, put on display the full, serious and sincere cooperation of Iran with the IAEA. The report clearly states that “Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan”. Moreover, the IAEA Director General, as recently as 3 February 2008, stated that "we are making good progress in resolving the remaining outstanding issues of the past".
The last report of the Agency on Iran states that: ‘the Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on the issues raised in the context of the work plan. With the exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
It should be mentioned that the “alleged studies” was not in the list of outstanding issues raised by the Agency on the agreed work plan of 21st August 2007.
11. What is Iran's response to the report of American Intelligence Agencies (NIE) on Iran's nuclear issue?
The report emphasizes that Iran has not any military nuclear program since 2003. This confession is a relatively positive step forward and shows that all propaganda by the West on Iran's military nuclear program was baseless. The report proves that there was no legal base for referring Iran's nuclear issue to the Security Council, and this means that the resolutions adopted by the Council on Iran's nuclear issue were unlawful. The importance of this confession would be better understood if we take into consideration the history of hostile position of these agencies against Iran.
The NIE report on the other hand is based on this false presumption that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons before 2003. This presumption is totally wrong and unfounded. Numerous reports by the IAEA and the director general prove that there is no any indication of diversion of the declared nuclear materials from peaceful purposes whatsoever, and that the IAEA could verify the non-diversion of these materials and activities. It should be mentioned that in the wake of the NIE report – which reversed many of its previous baseless allegations against Iran’s peaceful nuclear program- the IAEA Director General stressed that Iran has been “vindicated in saying it has not been working on a weapons program”.
12. What’s Iran’s argument for illegality of the Security Council’s resolutions on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program?
• As an organ of an international organization created by states, the Security Council is bound by law, and Member States have every right to insist that the Council keeps within the powers they have accorded to it in the Charter.
• The Security Council must exercise those powers consistently with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Equally, the measures it takes must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with other international law. Members of the Security Council should not manipulate the Council’s procedure or undermine its credibility.
• Iran’s peaceful nuclear program was brought to the Security Council in violation of the Agency’s Statute. Iran had not violated its NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement. It had signed the Additional Protocol and started its voluntary implementation in 2003, and had also accepted the modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary Arrangement since the same year.
• Iran's peaceful nuclear activities cannot be characterized as a threat to peace by any stretch of law, fact or logic.
• The Security Council's decision to coerce Iran into suspension of its peaceful nuclear program is a gross violation of Article 25 of the Charter. It also undermines the Iranian people’s right to development and the right to education. • Noting all the facts especially the latest report of IAEA witch explicitly considers that 6 outstanding issues are resolved, there’s no reason to continue to deal with Iran’s nuclear issue in the UN Security Council.
• Undoubtedly, any further action by the Security Council on Iran’s nuclear program will adversely affect the present positive atmosphere prevailing in the areas of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA.
13. What’s Iran’s response to the Security Council’s resolution number 1803 on its peaceful nuclear program?
• The latest report of the IAEA dated the 22nd February 2008, has declared that all the outstanding issues regarding peaceful nuclear program of Iran have been resolved and confirmed that there has been no diversion in the Iranian peaceful nuclear activities. So the resolution no. 1803 is totally unwarranted and unlawful.
• All UN Member States have the freedom to enjoy their sovereign rights. Therefore, the adopted restrictions by the Council in the resolution 1803, and all other previous related resolutions are contrary to such sovereign rights of Iran. • The resolution has inserted the issue of suspension as a precondition, which is in apparent contradiction to their so-called goodwill for resumption of negotiations.
• By keeping this issue in the Security Council’s agenda, the integrity and credibility of the sole competent technical organization on nuclear activities of all countries, namely the IAEA, has been endangered and weakened.
14. Is there any initiative by Iran to resolve its nuclear standoff with the West?
During the past two years, the western countries have proposed some packages on Iran’s nuclear issue. Those packages had offered Iran a range of economic, political and security incentives to encourage it to stop its nuclear program. Although those packages had some incentives for Iran, but had ambiguities that needed to be clarified, with preconditions that violate Iran's legitimate rights. So Iran rejected the proposed packages by the West.
Instead, Iran has offered its proposal package aiming to resolve its nuclear standoff with the West. Iran has provided the IAEA, and the 5+1 Group, namely the United States, Britain, China, France, Russia and Germany, with the new package.
Iran's package is not addressed to one specific country or one specific theme. It is a comprehensive plan with broad proposals. The spirit of the plan is that Iran is ready to cooperate with all its capacity to resolve the world problems.
According to this package, all countries should participate in the developments that are brought about in the world. Iran is a great country, with large resources of oil and gas and a very strategic geographical situation. So, in the move towards a multi-polar world, Iran's capacity and power can not be ignored and the country could contribute to the world security. The package is about important international issues including security, world energy crisis, world food crisis, and so on.
Iran has serious proposals about what to do to reduce threats resulting from the nuclear issue to the minimum. Iran has realistic proposals on how to minimize the nuclear threat around the world and how to encourage nuclear disarmament around the globe, and, at the same time promote continued technological cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy.
We believe that any proposal to solve Iran’s nuclear issue standoff should be based on cooperation and consultation instead of confrontation and intimidation.
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